Burn irreversibility
Optimistic settlement rests on a state change no reorg can undo — not on trusting a quorum first.
Every Solana wallet is signed with Ed25519, a classical signature a quantum computer will eventually break. Adversaries can harvest now and decrypt later. SOQ-TEC is software a licensed custodian runs to move value between Solana and the Soqucoin L1 under post-quantum signatures. Soqucoin Labs demonstrates it on Solana devnet and Soqucoin stagenet only.
Solana signs with Ed25519. Soqucoin signs with ML-DSA-44. SOQ-TEC is the settlement software between them.
Solana signs with Ed25519, a classical signature. A future quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm recovers an Ed25519 private key from its public key, and every Solana wallet publishes its public key the first time it signs. Soqucoin signs with ML-DSA-44, the NIST FIPS 204 lattice scheme, which has no known quantum attack.
SOQ-TEC is the settlement software that lets a licensed custodian move value between the two chains and hold it under post-quantum signatures on Soqucoin. The custodian operates it under its own licence. Soqucoin Labs builds the software and demonstrates it on test networks.
Quantum Express settles a cross-chain transfer in under thirty seconds — without waiting for an attestation quorum first.
The trick is physics, not trust. When you burn pSOQ on Solana, the tokens stop existing, a state change no reorganization or validator majority can reverse. Because the burn is irreversible, the operator’s relayer can release SOQ on the L1 immediately. A separate, deferred batch later commits a 3-of-5 ML-DSA-44 (Dilithium) attestation, a Merkle root anchored to both chains, as the post-quantum audit layer.
Optimistic release is demonstrated on Solana devnet and Soqucoin stagenet. The batched post-quantum attestation and the 240-block maturity window are part of the production design.
A signature you can only use once can’t be replayed, and a key that’s already spent can’t be stolen. The vault is built entirely from WOTS+ — hash-based one-time signatures over Keccak256.
Each withdrawal consumes the key at the current position and the “door” advances by one. When the tree is exhausted, the vault rotates atomically to a fresh tree in a single transaction — there is never a window where custody falls back to a classical key. Value moves WOTS+ → Dilithium and back; Ed25519 only ever pays Solana’s transaction fee, never guards value.
Security rests on hashes, not algebra — the structure Shor’s algorithm has no purchase on.
A scripted replay of the demonstration with links to every devnet transaction is on the demonstration page.
SOQ-TEC’s post-quantum claim is forward-looking: when a quantum computer can run Shor’s algorithm, today’s Ed25519 and ECDSA signatures become forgeable — and every classical bridge with them. The attestation and the vault are built on lattice and hash cryptography that has no known quantum attack. We don’t claim it would have stopped past bridge exploits — those were implementation bugs, and correct, audited code prevents that class.
Optimistic settlement rests on a state change no reorg can undo — not on trusting a quorum first.
Forging an attestation needs three independent ML-DSA-44 keys — signatures quantum computers cannot recover.
Custody is WOTS+ one-time keys, then Dilithium. Value never rests on Ed25519.
Releases halt automatically if total burned and total released stop reconciling, pending multisig review.
Demonstrated on stagenet and devnet; not mainnet, not for real value. Independent audit: Halborn (completed and remediated). A production deployment by a licensed operator would carry its own review.
The gateway program, the XMSS vault program, and the relayer are open source under MIT. Read the architecture and the on-chain programs.